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Abstract
Recent experimental evidence [Grujic´ et al., PLoS ONE 5, e13749 (2010)] on the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma suggests that players
choosing to cooperate or not on the basis of their previous action and the actions of their neighbors coexist with steady defectors
and cooperators. We here study the coexistence of these three strategies in the multiplayer iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma by means
of the replicator dynamics. We consider groups with n = 2, 3, 4 and 5 players and compute the payoffs to every type of player as
the limit of a Markov chain where the transition probabilities between actions are found from the corresponding strategies. We
show that for group sizes up to n = 4 there exists an interior point in which the three strategies coexist, the corresponding basin
of attraction decreasing with increasing number of players, whereas we have not been able to locate such a point for n = 5. We
analytically show that in the limit n → ∞ no interior points can arise. We conclude by discussing the implications of this theoretical
approach on the behavior observed in experiments.
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1. Introduction
In the past few years, different mechanisms have been pro-
posed to explain the origin and stability of cooperation (Nowak,
2006). One of these mechanisms involves assortment of coop-
erators (Fletcher and Doebeli, 2009), in particular through the
existence of a spatial or social structure dictating who interacts
with whom (cf. network reciprocity in Nowak (2006)). Coop-
erators might then interact mainly with each other and keep the
benefits of cooperation to the extent that they perform better
than defectors or free riders in peripheral positions. This idea
stems from the work by Nowak and May (1992b), who car-
ried out a simulation of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
(Rapoport and Guyer, 1966; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) on a
lattice in which every individual interacted with her eight near-
est neighbors. Their finding of sizable proportions of coopera-
tive actions even when the temptation to defect was quite large
stimulated a large amount of work on evolutionary game the-
ory on graphs (for reviews see, e.g., Szabo´ and Fa´th (2007) and
Roca et al. (2009)). Unfortunately, in spite of the large body
of theoretical work devoted to this issue, it has not been pos-
sible to reach a general conclusion about how the existence of
structure on a population could promote cooperation: indeed, it
was shown that the emergence and survival of cooperative be-
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haviors depended so crucially on the details of the models that
their applicability to real life situations was dubious, at best.
In view of this situation, in the last few years a number
of groups have carried out experiments to probe the relation-
ship between population structure and cooperation with real
human subjects (Kirchkamp and Nagel, 2007; Traulsen et al.,
2010; Grujic´ et al., 2010). Arguably, the main conclusion of
this research is that lattice-like structures do not seem to pro-
mote cooperation, at least not to a extent different from what is
found in dyadic or small group experiments (Kagel and Roth,
1995; Camerer , 2003). While the lack of promotion of co-
operation is well established, the reasons proposed by the dif-
ferent teams to explain the experimental observations are dif-
ferent, and there is no consensus yet as to what is the way
the subjects updated their decisions during the experiment. In
particular, Kirchkamp and Nagel (2007) focused on disproving
the imitation strategy proposed by Nowak and May (1992b),
a conclusion also suppported by Grujic´ et al. (2010). On the
other hand, Traulsen et al. (2010) fitted their results to a payoff-
dependent imitation behavior —Fermi rule (Szabo´ and To¨ke,
1998)—, finding that they needed a large amount of random
mutation to explain their observations.
In the above context, the analysis carried out by Grujic´ et al.
(2010) brought in an alternative way to understand the ex-
perimental observations by building upon the idea of reci-
procity (Trivers , 1971), i.e., the fact that individuals behave
depending on the actions of their partners in the past. In iter-
ated two-player games, this idea has been studied through the
concept of reactive strategies (Nowak and Sigmund, 1989a,b,
1990; Nowak and May, 1992a) (see (Sigmund , 2010) for a
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comprehensive summary on this matter), the most famous of
which is Tit-For-Tat (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981), given by
playing what the opponent played in the previous run. Reac-
tive strategies generalize this idea by considering that players
choose their action among the available ones with probabilities
that depend on the previous action of the opponent. For the
simple case of two strategies (say C and D), players choose C
with probability p following a C from their partner and with
probability q after a D from their partner. Subsequently this
idea was further developed by considering memory-one reac-
tive strategies (Nowak et al., 1995; Sigmund , 2010), in which
the probabilities depend on the previous action of both the focal
player and her opponent —i.e., the focal player would choose
C with some probability following a (C,C) outcome, and so on.
In iterated multi-player games, such as public goods games
or multi-player Prisoner’s Dilemmas (IMPD), reciprocity arises
in the form of conditional cooperation (Fischbacher et al.,
2001; Ga¨chter, 2007): individuals are willing to contribute
more to a public good the more others contribute. Conditional
cooperation has been observed a number of times in public
goods experiments (Croson , 2006; Fischbacher and Ga¨chter,
2010), often along with a large percentage of free-riders. The
experiment by Traulsen et al. (2010) showed also evidence for
such a behavior in an spatial setup. Grujic´ et al. (2010) ex-
tended this idea in their analysis to include the dependence
of the focal player’s previous action, introducing the so-called
moody conditional cooperation (cf. Figure 1). In this strategy,
players are more prone to cooperate after having cooperated
than after having defected, and in the first case they are more
cooperative the more cooperative neighbors they have. This
behavior has not been reported before in spatial games and
appears to be a natural extension of the reactive strategy idea
to multi-player games (among the very many other extensions
one can conceive). On the other hand, and from an economic
viewpoint, which is an important part of the analysis of human
behavior, this type of strategy update scheme responds to the
often raised questions on payoff-based rules. In economic in-
teractions it is usually the case that agents perceive the others’
actions but not how much do they benefit from them, and there-
fore the use of action updates depending, e.g., on the payoff
differences, may be questionable. This seems to be the case
even if this information is explicitly supplied to the players
(Grujic´ et al., 2010).
Interestingly, the conclusion of Grujic´ et al. (2010) had
a new feature as compared to the other two experiments
(Kirchkamp and Nagel, 2007; Traulsen et al., 2010), namely
the heterogeneity of the population: aside from the already
mentioned moody conditional cooperators, there were a large
minority of defectors, i.e., players that defected all or almost
all the time, and a few cooperators, that cooperated at practi-
cally all rounds. This heterogeneity, also found to be very im-
portant in public goods experiments (Fischbacher and Ga¨chter,
2010) had also been observed in four-player experiments by
Kurzban and Houser (2005), who reported that their subjects
could be roughly classified in three main types, including de-
fectors, cooperators and conditional cooperators (called recip-
rocators in the original work), albeit they did not check for
dependences on the past actions of the players either. Both
Kurzban and Houser (2005) and Grujic´ et al. (2010) checked
that the payoffs obtained by every type of player were more or
less the same, thus suggesting that the population in the lattice
experiment might be at an evolutionary equilibrium.
In this paper we address the question of the existence and
stability of such a heterogeneous or mixed equilibrium in the
multiplayer iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. It is important to un-
derstand that we are not addressing the issue of the evolutionary
explanation of moody conditional cooperation. This is a very
interesting but also very difficult task, and in fact we do not even
have an intuition as to how can one address this problem in a
tractable manner. Our goal is then to understand whether or not
the coexistence of moody conditional cooperators, defectors,
and a small percentage of cooperators, as observed in the exper-
iment, is theoretically possible. In so doing, we will shed light
on experimental and theoretical issues at the same time. On
the experimental side, our results show that there is coexistence
for groups of 2 or 3 players for parameters reasonably close to
those found in the experiment, but not for larger groups. As we
will see in the discussion section, this prediction has important
consequences related to the adequacy of replicator dynamics to
describe the experimental result or to the cognitive capabilities
of human subjects in dealing with large groups. We will also
discuss there the ways in which our theoretical approach and
the experiment may differ, something that can also have im-
plications of its own. On the theoretical side, we present an
analysis of a population of players interacting through a multi-
player Prisoner’s Dilemma including strategies that generalize
the ideas behind reactive strategies, as mentioned above. To our
knowledge, this has not been carried out before, at least to the
extent we are doing it here, in which we are able to show how
this coexistence depends on the size of the groups considered.
We believe that the approach we are presenting may be useful
for other researchers working on related problems.
With the above goals in mind, we introduce below a model
in which populations consisting of the three types of individu-
als discussed above, namely cooperators, defectors, and moody
conditional cooperators, play a multiplayer iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma with populations evolving according to the replica-
tor dynamics. We have considered different group sizes, from
n = 2 through n = 5 players, a size whose outcome is well de-
scribed by the limit n → ∞, which we analyze separately. In
the following, we report on our findings concerning this system
beginning by a detailed introduction of our model (Sec. 2). The
key to our analytical approach is the payoffmatrix, whose com-
putation we carry out by means of Markov chain techniques.
Section 3 presents the calculation in full detail for n = 2 play-
ers (i.e., the standard iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma) and, subse-
quently, proceeds to the replicator dynamics analysis of the so-
obtained payoff matrix. We then extend our approach to larger
groups (n = 3, 4, 5) in Sec. 4. As this becomes more and more
cumbersome, in Sec. 5 we address the limit n → ∞ analytically
finding exact results about the possible equilibria of the model.
Finally, Sec. 6 concludes by comparing our results to the exper-
iments and discussing the implications of such a comparison in
terms of theoretical explanations of the observed behavior and
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Figure 1: Probabilities of cooperating after playing C or D, conditioned to the context (number of cooperators in the previous round) in the two experiments by
Grujic´ et al. (2010). Parameters of the fitted lines will be used later as inputs for our replicator dynamics study. The line fitted to the probabilities of cooperation
after playing D is strictly horizontal.
their shortcomings.
2. Game, strategies and payoffs
Let us consider a well-mixed population of players who in-
teract via iterative multiplayer prisoner’s dilemmas (IMPDs).
In these games, players interact in groups of n players. Every
round each player adopts an action, either cooperate (C) or de-
fect (D), and receives a payoff from every other player in the
group according to a standard prisoner’s dilemma payoff ma-
trix (a cooperator receives R from another cooperator and S
from a defector; a defector receives T from a cooperator and
P from another defector; payoffs satisfy T > R > P > S ).
We note that this is a generalized version of a public goods
game: In the latter, if there are k cooperators, a defector re-
ceives bk whereas a cooperator receives b′(k − 1) − c (b′ = b in
a standard public goods game). In an multiplayer PD, a defec-
tor receives (T − P)k + P(n − 1) whereas a cooperator receives
(R − S )(k − 1) + S (n − 1), and hence choosing b = T − P,
b′ = R − S and c = (P − S )(n − 1) the IMPD becomes a gener-
alized public goods game. Notice an important difference with
respect to the standard public goods game: in this generalized
version (b , b′) the difference between the payoff received by
a cooperator and a defector depends on the number of coopera-
tors.
Inspired by the experimental results of Grujic´ et al. (2010)
but keeping at the same time as few parameters as possible,
we will classify players’ strategies into three stereotypical be-
haviors: mostly cooperators, who cooperate with probability p
(assumed relatively close to one) and defect with probability
1 − p; mostly defectors, who cooperate with probability 1 − p′
and defect with probability p′ (for simplicity we will assume
p′ = p); and moody conditional cooperators, who play depend-
ing on theirs and their opponents’ actions in the previous round.
Specifically, if they defected in the previous round they will co-
operate with probability q, whereas if they cooperated in the
previous round they will cooperate again with a probability
pC(x) = (1 − x)p0 + xp1 (1)
where x is the fraction of cooperative actions among the oppo-
nents in the previous round, and p0 < p1.
At this point, we would like to mention that our results do not
depend qualitatively on the “moodiness assumption”; in fact,
we have checked that redoing the calculations we will present
below for plain conditional cooperators (as those found by
Fischbacher et al. (2001); Ga¨chter (2007)) leads only to quan-
titative changes in the results. Therefore, we present our dis-
cussion in terms of moody conditional cooperators as they are
empirically more relevant.
To complete the definition of the model, we need to spec-
ify how the populations of the different strategies are going to
evolve in time. Players interact infinitely often in an IMPD, so
payoffs both increase in time and depend on the whole history
of play. It thus make sense to use the (time) average payoffs
to study the evolution of the game in terms of the abundance
of the three strategies considered. As these strategies are de-
fined depending on players’ actions in the round immediately
before, a multiplayer game with n players and given popula-
tions of each type of player can be described as a finite state
Markov chain whose states are defined by the actions taken by
the n players. Of course the chain is different for different com-
positions of strategies in the group. In any case, given that all
outcomes have non-zero probability, the chain is ergodic and
therefore there is a well defined steady state (Karlin and Taylor,
1975). Average payoffs are readily obtained once the proba-
bility vector in the steady state is known, and subsequent evo-
lution is described through imitation via replicator dynamics
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). In the next section we develop
all this formalism in full detail for the case n = 2, i.e., for the
usual iterated PD, taking advantage that in this case the expres-
sions that arise can be written in a compact way. The cases with
more than 2 players are dealt with in Sec. 4 in a more sketchy
manner.
3
3. Two-persons game (iterated PD)
3.1. General scheme of the approach
In the case n = 2 the states of the Markov chain are de-
scribed as CC, CD, DC, and DD, where the first action is the
focal player’s and the second one is the opponent’s. The transi-
tion probability matrix will be denoted as
M =

CC CD DC DD
CC m11 m12 m13 m14
CD m21 m22 m23 m24
DC m31 m32 m33 m34
DD m41 m42 m43 m44
, (2)
where mi j gives the probability that players who played i in the
previous round play j in the present round (i, j ∈ {CC, CD,
DC, DD}). The matrix M will of course depend on the nature
of the two players involved, so there will be nine different ma-
trices. Denoting ‘mostly cooperators’ by C, ‘mostly defectors’
by D and ‘moody conditional cooperators’ by X, the six com-
binations are CC, CD, CX, DD, DX, XX. As we stated above,
the Markov chains so defined are always ergodic; consequently,
the corresponding stationary probability vector, which we will
term pi = (piCC, piCD, piDC, piDD), is obtained by solving the equa-
tion pi = piM (Karlin and Taylor, 1975). Note that there is such
a stationary probability distribution pi for each of the six com-
binations of two players, as we will see below. Now, once the
probability distribution is known, the payoff matrix W = (wi j),
providing the average payoff that a player of type i gets when
confronted to a player of type j (i, j ∈ {C, D, X}) in an IMPD
(in this Section, n = 2, an iterated PD) can be computed as
wi j = RpiCC + S piCD + TpiDC + PpiDD. (3)
These payoffs can then be used in the replicator dynamics to
finally find the evolution of the three strategy population.
3.2. Payoff computation
Of the six combinations of players, three yield a trivial sta-
tionary vector pi because they do not depend on the previous
actions, namely those which do not involve the strategy X. The
corresponding payoffs are therefore straightforward to com-
pute, and we have (recall the focal player is denoted by the first
subindex):
wCC = p2R + p(1 − p)S + (1 − p)pT + (1 − p)2P, (4)
wCD = p(1 − p)R + p2S + (1 − p)2T + (1 − p)pP, (5)
wDC = (1 − p)pR + (1 − p)2S + p2T + p(1 − p)P, (6)
wDD = (1 − p)2R + (1 − p)pS + p(1 − p)T + p2P. (7)
The payoffs for the cases where the moody conditional coop-
erators, X, play, require computing the corresponding station-
ary probability. Let us begin with the Markov matrix (2) for a
mostly cooperator (C) and a conditional cooperator (X), given
by
M =

pp1 p (1 − p1) (1 − p)p1 (1 − p) (1 − p1)
pq p (1 − q) (1 − p)q (1 − p) (1 − q)
pp0 p (1 − p0) (1 − p)p0 (1 − p) (1 − p0)
pq p (1 − q) (1 − p)q (1 − p) (1 − q)
 , (8)
from which the stationary probability vector is given by
pi =
(
pq, p[1 − pC(p)], (1 − p)q, (1 − p)[1 − pC(p)])
1 + q − pC(p) , (9)
where pC(x) is given by (1) (notice that it represents the aver-
age probability for a conditional cooperator to cooperate, given
that she cooperated in the previous round, whereas her mostly
cooperator opponent cooperates with probability p). Therefore,
inserting (9) in (3) and having in mind who the focal player is,
we arrive at
wCX =[1 + q − pC(p)]−1
{
pqR + p[1 − pC(p)]S + (1 − p)qT
+ (1 − p)[1 − pC(p)]P
}
(10)
wXC =[1 + q − pC(p)]−1
{
pqR + (1 − p)qS + p[1 − pC(p)]T
+ (1 − p)[1 − pC(p)]P
}
. (11)
The case for a mostly defector facing a moody conditional
cooperator can be obtained immediately by realizing that the
defector behaves as a mostly cooperator whose probability of
cooperating is 1 − p instead of p, hence we find trivially
wDX =[1 + q − pC(1 − p)]−1
{
(1 − p)qR + pqT
+ (1 − p)[1 − pC(1 − p)]S + p[1 − pC(1 − p)]P
}
, (12)
wXD =[1 + q − pC(1 − p)]−1
{
(1 − p)qR + pqS
+ (1 − p)[1 − pC(1 − p)]T + p[1 − pC(1 − p)]P
}
. (13)
Finally, if two conditional cooperators confront each other,
the Markov matrix becomes
M =

p21 p1 (1 − p1) (1 − p1) p1 (1 − p1) 2
p0q p0 (1 − q) (1 − p0) q (1 − p0) (1 − q)
qp0 q (1 − p0) (1 − q) p0 (1 − q) (1 − p0)
q2 q (1 − q) (1 − q) q (1 − q) 2
 ,
(14)
and has a stationary vector pi which, up to normalization, is pro-
portional to a vector α with components
αCC = q2(1 + p0 − q),
αCD = q(1 − p1)(1 + p1 − q),
αDC = q(1 − p1)(1 + p1 − q),
αDD = (1 − p21)(1 − p0 − q) + 2qp0(1 − p1).
(15)
From this result one can compute wXX as in the other eight
cases. With the payoffs we have computed, we are now in a
position to proceed to the dynamical study.
3.3. Replicator dynamics
Denoting x = (xC, xD, xX) (with xC + xD + xX = 1) the vector
with the population fractions of the three types of players, the
dynamics of xi is described by the replicator equation
x˙i = xi[(Wx)i − x · Wx], (16)
where W is the payoff matrix obtained above.
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Figure 2: Phase portraits of the replicator dynamics for 2-players IMPD games
with three strategies (C, D, and X) for the parameters inferred from experiment
1 (top; p = 0.83, q = 0.26, p0 = 0.44, p1 = 0.60) and experiment 2 (bottom;
p = 0.83, q = 0.21, p0 = 0.34, p1 = 0.98). Rest points marked in the plot can
be repellors (white), saddle points (grey) or attractors (black).
In order to use this dynamics in connection with the experi-
ment of Grujic´ et al. (2010), we need to recall the payoffs used
in that work, namely T = 10, R = 7, P = S = 0 [i.e., a
weak prisoner’s dilemma as in Nowak and May (1992b)]. Two
consecutive experiments were carried out, leading to two dif-
ferent sets of parameters for the behavior of the players. Fig-
ure 2 shows the dynamics resulting for both sets of parameters,
whose specific values are listed in the caption. As we may see,
there are no interior points, which would indicate equilibria in
which the three strategies coexist, as observed in the experi-
ment. The only equilibria we find for these parameters are in
the corners of the simplex, C being always a repeller, D an at-
tractor and X being a saddle point or an attractor depending on
the parameters. In the case where D and X are both attractors
it is X that has the largest basin of attraction (almost the en-
tire simplex), Therefore, the results for this model do not match
what is observed in the experiment. However, it is important to
keep in mind that in the experiment players played with their
eight neighbors, this being the reason why we will later address
the dynamics of IMPDs with larger groups.
Notwithstanding this first result, as we will now see it is very
interesting to dwell into the n = 2 case in more detail. For the
purpose of illustrating our results, let us choose the behavioral
parameters to be p = 0.83, q = 0.20, p0 = 0.40, and p1 =
0.80, which are values we could consider representative of both
experiments. Inserting these parameters into the calculations
above, we find that the payoff matrix is given by

0 −0.3366 0.4367
1.6434 0 −0.1800
1.0026 −0.0526 0
 . (17)
This type of matrix belongs to a class of games studied by
Zeeman (1980) [compare it with matrix (A.1) in Appendix A].
In fact, in a region of parameters near those that can be inferred
from the experiments of Grujic´ et al. (2010) the game behaves
as a Zeeman game. The Zeeman game has five rest points (see
Appendix A): an unstable one at the C corner, a stable one at
the D corner, a saddle point at the X corner, and two mixed
equilibria on the C–X and on the D–X edges of the simplex.
Besides, under certain constraints (c.f. (A.3)) there is also an
interior point.
Turning now to our example matrix (17), its non-trivial rest
points turn out to be (0, 0.7739, 0.2261), (0.3034, 0, 0.6966),
and (0.1093, 0.3876, 0.5031). The stability of these mixed, in-
terior equilibria depends on the parameters (see Appendix A).
For the present case, the situation is similar to that shown in
Figure A.10(a). Thus the evolution of this system is governed
by the presence of two attractors: the interior point and the D
corner, each with a certain basin of attraction. A key feature
of the class of problems we are considering is that the precise
location of the interior rest point is very sensitive to the val-
ues of the parameters. Figures 3–6 illustrate what happens to it
when each of the four probabilities that define the strategies are
changed around the values given above. Generally speaking,
the figures show that the interior point approaches either one
of the rest points on the edges C–X and D—X, while these in
turn move along their edges. The specific details depend on the
parameter one is considering as can be seen from the plots. We
have also found that larger changes in the parameters can make
the interior point coalesce with the mixed equilibrium on the C–
X edge —thus transforming the dynamics into the one sketched
in Figure A.10(c)— or even change the Zeeman structure of the
payoff matrix yielding different stable equilibria (generally at
the corners). Notice that —particularly so in experiment 2—
the values of the parameters are not far from those producing
the plots of Figures 3–6. This indicates that, while we would
not expect a two-person theory to describe quantitatively the
experiments, the existence of an interior point with the same
kind of mixed population as observed is possible with minor
modifications of the parameters.
4. Games involving more than two players
Having discussed in depth the replicator dynamics for the
IPD with mostly cooperators, mostly defectors and moody con-
ditional cooperators, with the result that an interior point with
a sizable basin of attraction exists for a wide range of parame-
ters, we now increase the number of players to check whether
the theory is a valid description of the experimental results. The
mathematical approach for the case when more that two play-
ers are involved is similar to that for two players, only com-
putationally more involved. The Markov transition matrix (2)
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Figure 3: Phase portraits of the replicator dynamics for 2-players IMPD games with three strategies (C, D, and X) for different values of p: 0.80 (left), 0.83 (middle),
and 0.90 (right). Other parameters: q = 0.2, p0 = 0.4, p1 = 0.8. Rest points marked in the plot can be repellors (white), saddle points (grey) or attractors (black). In
all three cases the inner point as well as the xD = 1 point are the only attractors of the system.
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Figure 4: Phase portraits of the replicator dynamics for 2-players IMPD games with three strategies (C, D, and X) for different values of q: 0.10 (left), 0.15 (middle),
and 0.30 (right). Other parameters: p = 0.83, p0 = 0.4, p1 = 0.8. Rest points marked in the plot can be repellors (white), saddle points (grey) or attractors (black).
In the last two cases the inner point as well as the xD = 1 point are the only attractors of the system. In the latter case the point xD = 1 has merged with the saddle
in the edge xC = 0 becoming a saddle point. Correspondingly, the basin of attraction of xD = 1 has disappeared.
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Figure 5: Phase portraits of the replicator dynamics for 2-players IMPD games with three strategies (C, D, and X) for different values of p0: 0.20 (left), 0.40
(middle), and 0.50 (right). Other parameters: p = 0.83, q = 0.2, p1 = 0.8. Rest points marked in the plot can be repellors (white), saddle points (grey) or attractors
(black). In all three cases the inner point as well as the xD = 1 point are the only attractors of the system.
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Figure 6: Phase portraits of the replicator dynamics for 2-players IMPD games with three strategies (C, D, and X) for different values of p1: 0.70 (left), 0.75
(middle), and 0.85 (right). Other parameters: p = 0.83, q = 0.2, p0 = 0.4. Rest points marked in the plot can be repellors (white), saddle points (grey) or attractors
(black). In all three cases the inner point as well as the xD = 1 point are the only attractors of the system.
now describes a chain containing 2n states, n being the num-
ber of players. These are described as all combinations of C
or D actions adopted by each of the n interacting agents. On
the other hand, there will be (n+ 2)(n+ 1)/2 such matrices dis-
playing all possible combinations of the three strategies (C, D,
X). Obtaining the expressions for them is of course straight-
forward, but doing it analytically for n > 2 is out of question.
Once the matrices are obtained computing the vector pi contain-
ing the 2n stationary probabilities for each of the states simply
amounts again to solving the linear system pi = piM, readily
providing the payoffs for any strategy i when confronted with
any set i1, . . . , in of strategies of the n− 1 opponents. The result
can be cast in a tensor W = (Wi,i1,...,in−1 ). For a population com-
position x the payoff received by an individual of strategy i will
thus be
Wi(x) =
∑
i1,...,in−1=C, D, X
Wi,i1,...,in−1 xi1 · · · xin−1 , (18)
and the average payoff of the population will be
W(x) =
∑
i=C, D, X
xiWi(x). (19)
Finally, the replicator dynamics is then given by
x˙i = xi[Wi(x) − W(x)]. (20)
Expression (18) can be further simplified if we exploit the
symmetry implicit in public goods games, where the identity
of the players is not at all relevant, only the number of them
using a given strategy. This means that many payoffs are equal
because
Wi,i1,...,in−1 = Wi(nC, nD, nX), (21)
i.e., the payoff obtained by an i strategist only depends on the
number nC of cooperators, nD of defectors, and nX of condi-
tional cooperators (nC + nD + nX = n − 1) she is confronted to.
Then
Wi(x) =
∑
nC+nD+nX=n−1
nC,nD,nX≥0
(n − 1)!
nC!nD!nX!
Wi(nC, nD, nX)xnCC xnDD xnXX .
(22)
As in Sec. 3, for the parameters obtained from the experi-
ments there is no interior point that describes the coexistence of
the three strategies. We subsequently proceeded as in the previ-
ous case and tried to find ranges of parameters for which such
an interior point exists. It turns out that for groups of n = 3
players sets of parameters can also be found where the dynam-
ics is similar to that for n = 2 (see Figure 7 for an example),
albeit the parameters for which this happens are a bit differ-
ent —but still reasonably close to those of the experiments of
Grujic´ et al. (2010). As in the two player case, the structure
displayed in this figures turns out to be extremely sensitive to
variations in the parameters. Although we will not go into the
details of those modifications here, we find it interesting to note
that Figure 7 shows an evolution of the interior point with in-
creasing p very similar to that for n = 2 (cf. Figure 3), albeit
with more drastic changes, indicating that the existence of an
interior point is less generic. For IMPDs with larger groups we
find that, although for groups of n = 4 players it is still possible
to find a Zeeman-like phase map, one has to choose values for
p very close to one (meaning that cooperators and defectors are
nearly pure strategies) and on top of that the region where this
behavior can be obtained is extremely narrow. It can be clearly
observed in Figure 8, where several of these maps are shown
for different values of p1, that variations of about 1% notice-
ably displace the location of the interior point. Importantly, it
can be also observed from Figure 7 and Figure 8 that the basin
of attraction of the interior point, when it exists, shrinks upon
increasing the number of players, i.e., for n = 4 the fraction
of trajectories that end up in the D attractor is larger than those
ending in the interior point. Finally, for the largest group size
we could handle computationally, n = 5 players, we have not
been able to find an interior point for any choice of parameters.
It turns out that the outcome of this game for n ≥ 5 is well rep-
resented by the large group limit n → ∞, which unlike the case
of arbitrary but finite n, is amenable to analysis —as we show
in the next section.
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5. Infinitely large groups
Obtaining the payoffs (21) amounts to finding the station-
ary state of (n + 2)(n + 1)/2 Markov chains, each made of
(nC + 1) × (nD + 1) × (nX + 1) states, where nC + nD + nX = n
defines the composition of the n-player group. The size of the
corresponding Markov matrices grows as n3, which makes it
feasible to study groups even larger than n = 5 players. This
will not be necessary though, because the resulting chain can
be studied analytically in the limit n → ∞, which characterizes
well the behavior of large groups.
To determine how a group with nC + nD + nX = n players
of each type will respond in a given iteration of the prisoner’s
dilemma we only need to record the vector (kC, kD, kX) whose
components count how many players of each strategy cooperate
in a given round. Then the probability to observe the Markov
chain in a certain state given that in the previous round the state
was (lC, lD, lX) is
Pr
{kC, kD, kX|lC, lD, lX} =
(
nC
kC
)(
nD
kD
)
pnD−kD+kC (1 − p)nC−kC+kD
×
kX∑
j=0
(
lX
j
)(
nX − lX
kX − j
)
pC(x) j[1 − pC(x)]lX− j
× qkX− j(1 − q)nX−lX−kX+ j,
(23)
with the usual convention that
(
a
b
)
= 0 for b > a and where we
have introduced the short-hand notation
x ≡
lC + lD + lX − 1
n − 1
.
Extracting analytical information for finite n from this matrix is
not an easy task. However, let us focus on the limit n → ∞. It
is straightforward to show that
E
(
kC
n
∣∣∣∣∣ lC, lD, lX
)
= p
nC
n
,
E
(
kD
n
∣∣∣∣∣ lC, lD, lX
)
= (1 − p)nD
n
,
E
(
kX
n
∣∣∣∣∣ lC, lD, lX
)
= pC(x) lX
n
+ q
nX − lX
n
,
(24)
and
Var
(
kC
n
∣∣∣∣∣ lC, lD, lX
)
=p(1 − p)nC
n2
,
Var
(
kD
n
∣∣∣∣∣ lC, lD, lX
)
=p(1 − p)nD
n2
,
Var
(
kX
n
∣∣∣∣∣ lC, lD, lX
)
=pC(x)[1 − pC(x)] lX
n2
+ q(1 − q)nX − lX
n2
.
(25)
Hence, introducing the random variable ri ≡ ki/ni and denoting
xi ≡ ni/n, in the limit n → ∞ the probability density of ri
becomes a delta function around rC = p, rD = 1− p and rX, this
last quantity arising from the solution to the equation
rX =
{
p0+ (p1 − p0)[pxC+ (1− p)xD+ rX]}rX+q(1− rX). (26)
If p0 = p1 this is a linear equation with solution rX = q/(1 −
p0 + q). If p0 , p1 it is a quadratic equation with two solutions.
The one that reduces to the solution found for p0 = p1 is
rX =
2q
∆ +
√
∆2 − 4q(p1 − p0)xX
, (27)
∆ ≡ 1 − p0 + q − (p1 − p0)[pxC + (1 − p)xD]. (28)
Notice that ∆ > 0 as long as p1 > p0 > q, as required.
Factors ri yield the asymptotic, stationary fraction of cooper-
ative actions among players of type i in the group. Hence the
stationary level of cooperation is given by
κ ≡ pxC + (1 − p)xD + rX xX, (29)
and the corresponding payoffs of the three type of players are
WC(x) =pκR + p(1 − κ)S + (1 − p)κT + (1 − p)(1 − κ)P, (30)
WD(x) =(1 − p)κR + (1 − p)(1 − κ)S + pκT + p(1 − κ)P, (31)
WX(x) =rXκR + rX(1 − κ)S + (1 − rX)κT + (1 − rX)(1 − κ)P.
(32)
Notice that
WD(x) − WC(x) = (2p − 1)[κ(T − R) + (1 − κ)(P − S )], (33)
so as long as p > 1/2 we have WD(x) > WC(x) i.e., cooperators
are always dominated by defector irrespective of the composi-
tion of the population (provided xD > 0). This implies that no
interior point exists in the limit n → ∞, a property that suggests
that the fact that we have not been able to locate an interior point
for n = 5 is generic for larger values of n.
On the other hand,
WC(x) − WX(x) = (rX − p)[κ(T − R) + (1 − κ)(P − S )], (34)
WD(x) − WX(x) = (rX + p − 1)[κ(T − R) + (1 − κ)(P − S )],
(35)
so any solution to rX = p (rX = 1 − p) determines a rest point
on the xD = 0 (xC = 0) edge of the simplex. Taking the first
equation and assuming xD = 0 we obtain
(
2q
p
− ∆
)2
= ∆
2 − 4q(p1 − p0)xX.
Upon simplification this equation becomes
q + p2(xC + xX) = p(1 − p0 + q).
Given that xC + xX = 1 on the xD = 0 edge of the simplex, it
turns out that rX = p does not hold for any point of this edge.
A similar argument yields the same result for rX = 1 − p on
the xC = 0 edge of the simplex (the equations are the same just
replacing p by 1 − p and xC by xD).
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Figure 7: Phase portraits of the replicator dynamics for 3-players IMPD games with three strategies (C, D, and X) for different values of p: 0.90 (left), 0.92 (middle),
and 0.95 (right). Other parameters: q = 0.10, p0 = 0.20, p1 = 0.95. Rest points marked in the plot can be repellors (white), saddle points (grey) or attractors (black).
In all three cases the inner point as well as the xD = 1 point are the only attractors of the system.
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Figure 8: Phase portraits of the replicator dynamics for 4-players IMPD games with three strategies (C, D, and X) for different values of p1: 0.95 (left), 0.97
(middle), and 0.98 (right). Other parameters: p = 0.95, q = 0.20, p0 = 0.30. Rest points marked in the plot can be repellors (white), saddle points (grey) or
attractors (black). In all three cases the inner point as well as the xD = 1 point are the only attractors of the system.
We have thus established that, depending on the parameters
p1 > p0 > q and p > 1/2, on the xD = 0 edge of the sim-
plex either WC(x) > WX(x) or WC(x) < WX(x) irrespective of
the composition, and on the xC = 0 edge of the simplex either
WD(x) > WX(x) or WD(x) < WX(x) irrespective of the compo-
sition. In order to decide which one of the inequalities holds on
each edge we can set an arbitrary composition, namely xX = 1.
At this corner of the simplex
rX =
2q
1 − p0 + q +
√
(1 − p0 + q)2 − 4q(p1 − p0)
=
1 − p0 + q −
√
(1 − p0 − q)2 + 4q(1 − p1)
2(p1 − p0) .
(36)
Then WC(x) > WX(x) on xD = 0 if, and only if,
1 − p0 + q −
√
(1 − p0 − q)2 + 4q(1 − p1)
2(p1 − p0) > p >
1
2
, (37)
and WD(x) > WX(x) on xC = 0 if, and only if,
1 − p0 + q −
√
(1 − p0 − q)2 + 4q(1 − p1)
2(p1 − p0) > 1 − p. (38)
Notice that if (37) is true so is (38) (but the converse does not
hold).
For (37) to hold a necessary condition is that the left-hand
side is larger than 1/2, a condition that boils down to
1 − p1 + q >
√
(1 − p0 − q)2 + 4q(1 − p1)
=
√
(1 − p1 + q)2 + 2(p1 − p0)
(
1 − q −
p1 + p0
2
)
.
As p1 > p0, the only way that this can hold is if q + (p1 +
p0)/2 > 1. When inequality (37) is satisfied, D is an attractor,
X is a repellor, and C a saddle point. Otherwise C is a repellor
(obviously, a sufficient condition for this to happen is q + (p1 +
p0)/2 < 1). In this case D is an attractor and X a saddle point if
(38) holds and viceversa if it does not.
A summary of our results for n → ∞ is shown in the sketch
of Figure 9. As we can see from the plot, the main results are
that there never exists an interior point, that homogeneous C
populations are not stable, and that in two out of three cases the
final result of the dynamics is a homogeneous D population.
Therefore, although there is a region of parameters in which a
homogeneous population of moody conditional cooperators is
actually stable, we never observe coexistence even of pairs of
strategies.
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Figure 9: The only three phase portraits of the replicator dynamics for IMPD
games with three strategies (C, D, and X) played in infinitely large groups.
Rest points marked in the plot can be repellors (white), saddle points (grey)
or attractors (black). Map (a) appears if inequality (37) holds (a necessary
condition for this is q + (p1 + p0)/2 > 1); map (b) appears if inequality (37)
does not hold but inequality (38) does; map (c) appears if neither (37) nor (38)
hold (a sufficient condition for maps (b) and (c) to appear is q+(p1+p0)/2 < 1).
6. Discussion
Motivated by the recent experimental work by Grujic´ et al.
(2010), where conditional cooperation depending on the
player’s previous action was observed in a spatial prisoner’s
dilemma coexisting with cooperation and defection, we have
studied the replicator dynamics of the IMPD with these three
strategies. The fact that the experimental results indicated that
all three strategies were getting on average the same payoff sug-
gested that they were in equilibrium; on the other hand, as the
presence of a lattice had no significant consequences on the
level of cooperation, it seemed likely that the spatial game could
be understood in terms of separate multiplayer games.
Assuming a stylized version of the behaviors mentioned
above, we have focused on the problem of their coexistence in
well-mixed populations, when they interact in groups of n ≥ 2
players through an IMPD. For n = 2, in a region of param-
eters compatible with those of the experiment we do find a
mixed equilibrium in which all three types of players coex-
ist, and they do it in a proportion similar to that found in the
experiments. The phase portrait of the replicator dynamics re-
produces that of a three-strategies game introduced by Zeeman
(1980). However, upon increasing n, the region of parameters
of this Zeeman-like dynamics shrinks, and for n = 5, the max-
imum size we could analyze with our analytical approach, we
could not find a mixed equilibrium anymore.
Given that our Markov chain technique becomes computa-
tionally untraceable for larger sizes, we have carried out a rig-
orous analysis of the replicator dynamics for this game in the
limit n → ∞. The analysis reveals that in this limit, all rest
points other than the three corners of the simplex —that can be
found for small n— disappear. The dynamics in this limit is de-
termined by who beats who, depending on the parameters. Co-
operators are always defeated by defectors, but depending on
the parameters, conditional cooperators are displaced by any
other strategy, or only by defectors, or they can displace the
other two strategies.
Putting together our numerical results for small n and our
analytical calculations for large n, we can conclude that an imi-
tative evolution like the one represented by replicator dynamics
cannot account for the coexistence of strategies observed in the
experiments, at least in groups as large as n = 9 (the case of
the experiment). The reasons for this can be many. The most
obvious one is that replicator dynamics might not be what de-
scribes the evolution of strategies in human subjects. In this
regard, we have to make it clear that we are not studying the
evolution of the players during the experiment, as it was shown
by Grujic´ et al. (2010) that there is no learning. Our evolution-
ary approach would apply to much longer time scales, i.e., these
strategies would have arisen from interactions of human groups
through history. It may then well be the case that this slower
evolution of human behavior requires another approach to its
dynamics. By the same token, it might also occur that the typ-
ical number of iterations of the game is not very large, so the
stationary probability density obtained from the Markov chains
is not a good approximation to the observed behavior. All in
all, it is clear that our analytical model might not be the most
appropriate one to describe human behavior on IMPDs.
Nevertheless, another possible explanation for the discrep-
ancy between our predictions and the coexistence of moody
conditional cooperators with the cooperator and defector strate-
gists might come from bounded rationality considerations.
Thus, people may behave in a IMPD as though they were play-
ing a (two-person) IPD with some kind of an “average” oppo-
nent, something that can be reinforced by the computer inter-
face of the experiment that isolates the subjects from the other
ones with whom they interact. Such a heuristic decision making
process might be the result of cognitive biases or limitations,
among which the inability to deal with large numbers may be
of relevance here (Kahneman et al., 1982), or else it could arise
as an adaptation itself (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001). Whatever
the underlying reason, the fact that for n = 2 and n = 3 play-
ers we can easily find wide ranges of parameters for which the
three strategies coexist and, furthermore, this coexistence have
a large basin of attraction, suggests that the idea that people may
be extrapolating their behavior to larger groups should at least
be considered, and tested by suitably designed experiments.
On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the strate-
gies reported by Grujic´ et al. (2010) are aggregate behaviors,
as they attempted to classify the actions of the player in a few
archetypal types. Therefore, there may actually be very many
different moody conditional cooperators, defined by different
p0, p1 and q parameters and different propensities to cooperate
(parameter p) among cooperators and defectors. Alternatively
players who were classified as conditional cooperators might
be using a totally different strategy, different for every player,
which aggregated would look like the conditional cooperation
detected in the experiment. This is not included anywhere in
our replicator dynamics. It is certainly possible that consider-
ing several different subclasses of the strategy X in the replica-
tor dynamics might actually provide an explanation for coexis-
tence in larger groups. However, the corresponding calculations
become very much involved, and whether this variability can
sustain mixed equilibria is an interesting question that remains
out of the scope of this work.
As a final remark, we would like to stress that, notwithstand-
ing the issue that the agreement between our results and the ex-
periments is problematic, this study proves that, under replica-
tor dynamics, even for n → ∞ our work predicts the dominance
of moody conditional cooperators for certain regions of param-
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eters. It is important to realize that this type of strategy had
not been considered prior to the experimental observation, and
as we now see it can successfully take over the entire popula-
tion even from defection when playing an IMPD. This suggests
that this or similar strategies may actually be more widespread
than this simple case as they might also be the best ones in re-
lated games, such as the public goods game. It would be worth
widening the scope of this work by analyzing the possible ap-
pearance of this conditional cooperators who are influenced by
their own mood in other contexts, both theoretically and exper-
imentally. In this regard, an explanation of the evolutionary ori-
gin of moody conditional cooperators would be a particularly
important, albeit rather difficult goal.
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Appendix A. Zeeman’s game
Zeeman (1980) analyzed the evolutionary dynamics of three
strategies games. Appart from the well known rock-paper-
scissors (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) he identified a game
with the canonical payoff matrix for the strategies C, D and X,
given by 
0 −a2 b1
b2 0 −a3
a1 −b3 0
 , (A.1)
where all coefficients are positive. Any 3 × 3 payoff ma-
trix can be transformed into a zero diagonal one because
the replicator equation remains invariant if the same con-
stant is substracted from every element of one of its columns
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). The coefficients of the payoff
matrix (A.1) represent the payoff an invader gets when it in-
vades a homogeneous population. Thus a D or X individual
invading a homogeneous C population will get b2 or a1, respec-
tively. As both are positive a homogeneous C population is un-
stable. Similarly a C or X individual invading a homogeneous
D population will get −a2 or −b3, respectively. Therefore a ho-
mogeneous D population is uninvadable (hence stable). As for
a C or a D individual invading a homogeneous X population, it
will obtain b1 or −a3, respectively. It is therefore a saddle point
because it cannot be invaded by D individuals but it can by C
individuals.
This simple analysis fixes the flux of the dynamics at the
boundary of the simplex (Figure A.10). It also implies the exis-
tence of two rest points on the boundary of the simplex: one on
the D–X edge and another one on the C–X edge. These points
are given by
(
0, a3
a3 + b3
,
b3
a3 + b3
)
,
(
b1
a1 + b1
, 0, a1
a1 + b1
)
. (A.2)
Besides, an interior rest point (yC, yD, yX)/(yC + yD + yX), with
coordinates
yC = b3(a3 + b1) − a2a3,
yD = b1b2 − a1(b1 + a3),
yX = a1a2 + b2b3 − a2b2,
(A.3)
appears provided all three components have the same sign (Fig-
ure A.10(a)). Component yD is proportional to the difference
between the payoff of the population at the C–X mixed equilib-
rium and the payoff of a D invader. When it is negative the C–X
rest point becomes a saddle and the interior point is an attractor
(the situation depicted in Figure A.10(a)). When it is positive
a D individual cannot invade the C–X equilibrium, which then
becomes an attractor and the interior point becomes a repellor
(this is illustrated in Figure A.10(b)). If no interior point ex-
ists the behavior will be as plotted in Figure A.10(c) (Zeeman,
1980).
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